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Convergent evolution of sentience? 




Biological Sciences, Macquarie University 
 
Abstract:  Mikhalevich & Powell make a compelling case that some invertebrates may be 
sentient and that our moral obligations in the context of welfare should hence extend to them. 
Although the case is similar to that made for fishes, there is one obvious difference in that 
examples of invertebrate sentience probably arose independently from vertebrate sentience. 
We have unequivocal proof that complex cognition arose multiple times over evolutionary 
history. Given that cognition is our best tool for indirectly quantifying sentience, it seems 
highly likely that this multiple polygenesis may also have occurred for sentience. In 
acknowledging this, we must accept that the anthropocentric structure-function arguments 
that have surfaced in the context of pain are almost certainly too simplistic and cannot 
account for cases of convergent evolution. 
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Mikhalavich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make a compelling case that our moral obligations in the 
context of welfare should extend to some invertebrates. On the whole, the argument is much 
the same as the one invoked over the past 20 years for including fishes in our moral circle 
(e.g., Sneddon et al 2018).  The main difference, however, is one of phylogenic discontinuity.  
As M&P rightly point out, “invertebrates” are not a cohesive phylogenetic lineage. 
Many of the groups that exhibit complex cognition, and are probably sentient, are not recent 
vertebrate ancestors. Ironically, there is little evidence of complex cognition in the immediate 
ancestors of vertebrates – cephalochordata (lancelets) and Urochordata (tunicates). This 
strongly suggests that the cognitive sophistication observed in some invertebrate taxa arose 
completely independently. Indeed cephalopods, crustaceans and insects are themselves 
diverse taxa.  Even within the Protostomes we must conclude that advanced cognition arose 
independently in multiple clades of arthropods (eg hymenoptera, crustacea) as well as within 
the molluscs (solely the cephalopoda).   
This realisation has several implications for according welfare to invertebrates 
because the “other minds” in this instance are extremely different from our own.  At least 
with fishes we can safely argue that the cognitive tool-box, the underlying brain structure and 
the nervous system are highly conserved across all vertebrates, which makes arguments of 
homology relatively simple. In the case of the protostomes, one needs to argue a case of 
independent, convergent evolution. There is little to no homology, although the clear and 
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relevant examples include reward systems (and associated neuroanatomy and neuro-
tansmitters; Perry & Barron 2013) and nociceptors that are present in all Coelomates (Smith 
& Lewin 2009).   
This underscores that the simplistic, anthropocentric, structure-function view in the 
context of cognition and welfare has its limitations. Here the example I’m particularly thinking 
of is the misguided suggestion that mammalian pain is solely processed in the cortex (Key 
2016).  We are instead forced to accept that evolution often finds solutions to problems in a 
multitude of different ways. Pain perception has such obvious fitness benefits that it would 
be surprising if all animals did not have reasonably sophisticated ways of processing 
potentially harmful stimuli that go far beyond simple reflexes. We can state this as a clear fact 
about cognition given the well-known homologies and analogies among vertebrate brains 
(e.g., birds & mammals) and between vertebrates and some invertebrate (insect and 
cephalopod) brains and their functional capacity. Given what we know about the evolution of 
cognition, it seems increasingly likely that sentience evolved more than once. 
It seems unlikely that we will solve the other-minds problem any time soon. It is no 
longer just a philosophical conundrum, but a very real welfare issue for those animals that do 
have minds yet we mistakenly assume, or behave as if, they do not.  Too many key questions 
remain unanswered: How many neurons and at what level of interconnectivity does it take 
for sentience to emerge? Are there degrees of sentience? What were the evolutionary drivers 
of sentience? In the meantime, we do have at our disposal a rich array of animal behaviour 
research findings that illustrate the cognitive capacity of certain invertebrates as M&P have 
pointed out. At this point these are the best predictors of sentience at our disposal. And we 
are on very solid scientific ground because cognitive capacity can be measured quantitatively.  
With appropriate experimental design we can adopt a comparative approach to 
indirectly quantifying sentience across all taxa (Walters 2018; Snedddon et al 2014; Dorey and 
Brown 2019). Key behavioural indicators in the context of pain research will include 
demonstrating that animals change behavioural preferences or choices when suffering from 
pain or that they trade off pain with other needs or requirements (food, shelter or friends). 
These behavioural tests show clearly that animals are responding to pain in a sophisticated 
manner and indicate cognitive engagement rather than simple reflexive or nociceptive 
responses. 
It is an unfortunate reality that in order to study pain we must inflict it, albeit under 
very controlled conditions.  We are on pretty solid moral grounds if we use this knowledge to 
show that animals do feel pain and  that we can thereby eliminate cruelty wherever it may be 
found. We can also use cognition as a welfare indicator: For example, when investigating 
“valenced” affective states (emotions) we can use responses to ambiguous stimuli:  subjects 
tend to display a positive view of the world when in good welfare but they become pessimistic 
when suffering from poor welfare (cognitive bias; Mendl et al 2010; Bateson et al 2011). 
Although the study of animal emotions is in its infancy, few in the animal behaviour world 
would deny that -- as suggested by Darwin -- affective states evolved as important drivers of 
behaviour. I suggest that this premise provides a relatively simple and unambiguous way 
forward for studying not only insects but all non-human animals (Dawkins 2000; Mellor 2011). 
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